Cultural Resistance, Identity, and Afrikan Liberatory Praxis

 

Introduction: Music as Mirror, Hammer, and Liberatory Praxis

Throughout history, music has been a powerful protest tool to challenge and confront
societal norms and injustice. Intertwined with Black Political Thought, music has and
continues to play an integral role in individuals and movements that espouse social
progress. However, in the 21st century, hip-hop has become the most popular protest
musical form against inequality, injustice, and racial domination. In the case of South Africa, as early as the 20th century, music (irrespective of genre) united with Black Radical Tradition has always been a means by which indigenous Africans opposed racist disenfranchisement. An example is the 1920s composition by Reuben Caluza titled Silusapho Lwase Afrika (We are the children of Africa), which protested settlerism, white domination and economic exploitation.

Vocalist and traditional instrumentalist, Lu Dlamini, captures the essence of the role of music in liberation struggles. She notes that: “I realise that music in liberation struggles is like a mirror and a hammer. A mirror reflecting the truth of oppression, giving voice to the silenced and making the invisible seen. A hammer shattering complacency, fortifying the spirit of resistance and turning sorrow into strength.” Dlamini’s intervention on the role of music was practiced by many cultural activists such as Letta Mbulu and Caiphus Semenya. Their activism is explicitly extended by Thandiswa Mazwai’s inquiry, iphi inkaba yakho?

“Where is your umbilical cord?”

In her latest album Sankofa (2024), renowned South African born musician Thandiswa
Mazwai offers a song titled Children of the Soil where she poses the question, “iphi inkaba yakho” which can be translated as “where is your umbilical cord”. This is a startling question in a world obsessed with passports, borders, identity documents, and categories of race. The preoccupation with such categories and documents is designed to facilitate the statist and colonial placement and movement of people. This stands in sharp contrast to the question, “where is your umbilical cord?”, which understands home through a relationality defined by its people. The question arrives not as metaphor but as instruction. The song asks listeners to locate themselves within a lineage, a landscape, and a history. It asks where they come from, who they belong to, and what remains after centuries of dispossession.

These are old questions in South Africa. Long before they were debated in universities or
encoded in constitutions and policy documents, they were expressed orally and sung at
most funerals and political rallies. They appeared in hymn books, work songs, jazz
compositions, liberation anthems, and oral traditions that carried memory across
generations. In most political contexts, music has often been treated as accompaniment to political struggle. Yet for South Africans, music has frequently done something more
profound: it has preserved worlds that colonialism sought to erase. Music was and continues to a central form of orality in knowledge circulation and dissemination.

Taken together, these articulations open the ground for an Afrikan liberatory theoretical
framing in which music is understood as; a weapon of resistance, a repository of communal memory, a site of knowledge production, a central guide in the battle of ideas and a medium for reasserting Afrikan personhood against colonial erasure.

This framing aligns with the 2024 Afrika Liberation Hub Festival’s themes of cultural
resistance, reclamation, and collective liberation.

Music as an Archive of Worlds

Rather than framing music merely as a protest tool, one could argue that it also preserves entire social worlds.

This is where Ziph’inkomo becomes particularly powerful. When Semenya and Mbulu ask “Ziph’inkomo?”; they are not merely asking where the cattle have gone. The question
reverberates through a history of dispossession and disenfranchisement. In the African
indigenous sense, cattle occupied an economic role, certainly, but they also carried social, cultural, and spiritual significance. They linked families through lobola, anchored systems of reciprocity, and represented forms of wealth outside colonial markets. The loss of cattle was not only a loss to property. It was a dissipation of a way of organising social life, heritage and identity. Colonial conquest understood this. From the one-hundred-year wars of resistance, to the destruction of African agricultural systems, dispossession was never solely about land. It was about also about dismantling the institutions through which African communities reproduced themselves.

Sankofa and the Question of Identity: “Ningobani na?”

In Sankofa, Children of the Soil, Thandiswa Mazwai initiates another conversation throughthe lyrics: ‘Singabantu bokuqala, selifikile ithuba lokuziveza ningobani na, selifikile ithuba lokuzibika, iphi inkaba yakho?’

Translated:
‘We are the first people, the time to reveal who you are has arrived, the time to express
yourselves has arrived, where is your umbilical cord?’

This body of work is a cultural archive. The link between ‘ningobani na’ (who you are, in
plural) and ‘iphi inkaba yakho?’ (where is your umbilical cord?) is a question of place in
relation to belonging and personhood. To ask ‘ningobani na’ instead of ‘ungubani na’ is
central to how Black people connect the self to their community, their history, their culture and the knowledge of their ancestors. It is therefore a question about both community and identity.

This resonates with a core principle of Afrikan liberatory theory: that the self cannot exist without the collective, and that cultural expression retrieves what colonial modernity attempted to sever.

Cultural Archives as Resistance to Settler Colonialism

In the (South) African context, this kind of cultural archive can be understood as part of the same tradition where Black artists had to respond to, challenge and address daily racism, white domination, injustice, inequality and exploitation. To insist that “singabantu bokuqala” is to rebel against the colonial historicising of terra nullius. There are many examples that can be in conversation with Thandiswa Mazwai’s musical catalogue. What they all illuminate is that Black musicians not only resisted through music but drew from their way of life to advance an argument about the extent of the loss and disruption caused by settler colonialism and capitalism. Miriam Makeba’s A Piece of Ground, and Ziph’inkomo are but some of the examples.

Ziph’inkomo and the Political Imagination: Cattle, Community, and Colonial Disruption

Caiphus Semenya and Letta Mbulu’s Ziph’inkomo brings one to think about the place of
iinkomo (cattle) as currency and in playing a role in processes such as ukulobola, bringing together families, and sustaining community. If cattle, as assets and an idea, were that central in the way of life and social fabric of African people , one is prompted to think about the Ziph’inkomo as not only about ukulobola, but also about what happens in such a society when violations such as cattle culling and cattle stealing were part of the colonial machinery. What do people lose when they lose iinkomo zabo (their cattle)?

In this submission, we argue that ‘Ziph’inkomo’ provides a theorising practice and a political imagination that are prerequisites to challenge and address daily racism, white domination, injustice, inequality and exploitation. In the main, we are suggesting that music as a cultural practice plays a significant role in the preservation of Afrikan’s Identity and development of political reimagination.

This underscores a key tenet of Afrikan liberatory thought; to restore meaning to what
colonialism attempted to destroy is itself a revolutionary act.

Music as Archive, Protest, and Reclamation

The examples above show that music can play multiple roles. It can highlight how deeply
personal the political is, it can archive by preserving life histories and experience, and in turn preserve Afrikan identity and political reimagination. It is a protest tool. In our context, it is a protest against settler colonialism, neo-colonialism neo-apartheid, patriarchy, and capitalism. It is also a tool for reclamation, reclaiming African (Black) people’s ability to write their stories and convey that through song or music. We therefore understand music as a form of expression which has the ability to communicate the dissatisfaction, resistance and aspirations of African (Black) people in a world where their treatment shows that they are still not afforded the dignity of human beings.

From an Afrikan liberatory theoretical standpoint, music is not merely art-it is theory, praxis, and insurgent memory. It constitutes epistemic resistance (refusing colonial knowledge hierarchies), cultural continuity (maintaining Afrikan worldviews), political imagination (envisioning liberated futures) and collective healing (restoring dignity and wholeness).

Conclusion: Afrikan Liberatory Framing

To synthesise these works together-Sankofa, Children of the Soil, Ziph’inkomo, and the
expansive tradition they anchor is to witness the assembly of a formidable liberatory
framework. This framing shows the revolutionary character of art and artist, and how it and they can be a rigorous, creative intellectual project.

The lyrical content of Thandiswa’s Children of the Soil, Semenya and Mbuluare the active and deliberate return to the source interventions to reclaim an identity fractured by historical violence. These bodies of work are notes on Ubuntu, where the collective self serves as the very ground of being, contrary to hyper-individualism. In this space, cultural memory becomes an archive, a form of resistance that preserves what ‘official’ histories try to bury.

This sonic anti-colonial praxis is a reclamation of land, language, lineage, and stories which narrate African ways of being. It functions as a bridge of generational continuity, a
conversation sustained across time between ancestors and descendants. Within this
framing, Afrikan music is a strategic, liberatory tool-a vessel carrying not only our political imagination and ancestral knowledge, but our absolute refusal to be erased. Colonialism sought many things. It sought land, labour, and political control. But it also sought to interrupt memory. It attempted to sever people from language, ancestry, territory, and ways of knowing. South African music reveals the limits of that project.

From Reuben Caluza’s declarations of African belonging to Letta Mbulu and Caiphus
Semenya’s reflections on loss, and from liberation songs to Thandiswa Mazwai’s
Children of the Soil, music has remained a site where Black people remembered
themselves.

This is why these songs matter. They do more than entertain. They carry political
theory, historical memory, and visions of freedom. They remind us that liberation is not
only the struggle to build a different future. It is also the struggle to recover what was
never meant to survive.

References
Caluza, R. (1920s). Silusapho Lwase Afrika (We are the children of Africa).
Dlanga, T. O. (n.d.). Rhythm of Resistance: Caiphus Semenya and Letta Mbulu’s
Ziph’inkomo Composition.
Dlamini, L. (n.d.). Quotation on music as mirror and hammer.
Mazwai, T. (2023). Sankofa: “Children of the Soil”

(By Y. Phyllis , T. Dlanga and LL Pheko)

(Image Credit: Blessing Ngobeni, “Healing Notes, 2025” / David Krut Projects)

The cost of living is not the worth of being alive

 

                                                     The cost of living,
he would argue, is not the worth of being alive.
Richard Michelson, More Money Than God

In the past few days, two articles have highlighted the economic and existential difficulties of living as more than surviving, in this instance in Namibia. On Monday, two days ago, “Old people in Namibia are going into debt to pay for everyday costs – new report examines strained household budgets” relying on a new report, shared the “stark” central argument: “Disability is produced as much by environment as by the body. Manageable health conditions become crises because of failing housing, absent sanitation, unaffordable assistive devices and precarious income. It falls to unpaid family caregivers to absorb these crises.” One day ago, another report, “Namibians need N$44 000 salary to afford homes” had an equally “stark” argument: “70% of the population cannot afford formal housing because of low incomes and limited access to mortgages … The cost of putting a new house on the market is increasing faster than the cost of living for households hoping to buy one.” There it is, that phrase, “the cost of living.” A phrase that hides as much as it reveals and reveals its true nature in its acts of hiding.

The cost of living is generally defined as “the cost of maintaining a certain standard of living.” What exactly is this “certain” standard of living? On one hand, it isn’t exactly anything, in that it isn’t and never has been exact. On the same hand, “prior to the World War attention was directed by Mr. Seebohm Rowntree (Poverty, A Study of Town Life, 2nd ed. 1902) to the cost of obtaining in York (England) and elsewhere food, clothing, heat, light and shelter sufficient for a family to maintain itself in health and efficiency for work, when all possible economy was practised, subject to the availability of commodities and the legal requirements for housing, decency, etc.” Etc. This is “where the standard is a physiological minimum”.

In other words, from its early days, the cost of living was founded in class struggle, that is, the struggle of one class of people, workers, to survive. People of means do not have a cost of living, because they do not have a standard that is a physiological minimum. Put differently, the cost of living is the cost-of-not-dying is the cost of dying silently and unseen.

In Namibia, a senior in the capital, Windhoek, is having trouble breathing. The family calls the public ambulance, to no avail. They then call the Windhoek Ambulance service. It comes, with a charge of 800 Namibian dollars. The senior’s family doesn’t have the money. No problem. The city will add it to their utilities bill. The family still doesn’t have the money but needs electricity and water … and so they go into debt. The cost of providing care is increasing faster than the cost of living.

And the costs and cost of caring? Who measures those, and how are they measured?

(By Dan Moshenberg)

(Image Credit: Pedro Vorster, “This Space Is Vacant No More” / Imago Mundi)

The uncounted, discounted turmoil of eviction

And from this chasm, with ceaseless turmoil seething
Samuel Taylor Coleridge

In the Hampton Roads area of Virginia, a landlord targeted, harassed, and persecuted residents of his property. The residents were predominantly working class, Black women. He threatened them with eviction as part of a campaign of racial and sexual abuse. The women organized, went to court, and, after years and against many odds, won a landmark settlement. Over the next year, the landlord must pay $2.5 million in dollars in financial compensation to tenants and the state. Additionally, he must sell all his properties in Virginia and can never operate in the Commonwealth of Virginia again. All records of evictions and eviction filings will be erased. Additionally, the landlord is already serving a 17-year sentence in federal prison. So, this is a victory for tenants. And yet …

And yet many feel that the part of the story that goes missing is the emotional: the loss, the pain, the missing, the turmoil. Lorraine Patterson-Davidson is one of the residents of this story. Lorraine Patterson-Davidson is a widowed military-spouse with eight children. While pleased that she and her family will be able to recoup some of the money they lost, or better that was stolen from them, they mourn the loss of family history, the loss of the irreplaceable. In this instance, a family Bible that was over a hundred years ago, an object that was tossed on the street and lost during an eviction: “There is no money that can compensate for a Bible that’s over 100 years old. Nothing can replace that.”

Nothing can replace that.

Reflecting on the impact of the entire process, Lorraine Patterson-David mused, “I’m not sure I’m the same person. But (the Bible) says ‘be angry and sin not’”.

Lorraine Patterson-Davidson is teaching the world is that eviction is not merely a legal process nor a matter of housing. Eviction invades the person, and that invasion is part of the purpose of eviction. Eviction is turmoil, a word that historically has no beginning and yet persists and pervades. Look around, locally and globally. What do you see? What do you hear? What do you feel? Turmoil. Where is the turmoil, the emotional pain, in public policy concerning eviction? Where is the peace and emotional well-being in public policy concerning affordable housing? Lorraine Patterson-Davidson cherished her family Bible. Nothing can replace that. Who cares?

I’m not sure I’m the same person. Nothing can replace that. Lorraine Patterson-Davidson is teaching us that something cannot be replaced. Someone cannot be replaced. Lorraine Patterson-Davidson is teaching, but are we listening? Be angry and sin not.

(by Dan Moshenberg)

(Image Credit: Rashid Johnson, Untitled)

Poem for Professor Arday: When Breath Becomes a Country

I wrote this in grief, but also in discomfort.

There are deaths that ask us not only to mourn, but to reckon with what happened while a person was still alive: the hounding, the racialised scrutiny, the slow taking apart of a human being in public, and the silences that gather around it.

When Breath Becomes a Country is a dirge for what cannot be undone. It is also about regret — about the terrible lateness of recognising what someone may have been carrying only after they are gone.

I did not want to write a poem of easy hope. I wanted to stay with the shame, the sorrow and the question of what solidarity demands before mourning becomes necessary.

This is for the hunted, and for the living.

When Breath Becomes a Country

There are griefs that do not arrive.
They accumulate.

A headline. A whisper. A thousand small permissions
given to cruelty
until cruelty believes itself righteous.

And somewhere a human being learns
the terrible arithmetic of being watched:

how softly to speak,
how carefully to enter a room,
how brightly not to shine,
how much of yourself to surrender
before they call you safe.

We know this arithmetic.

Its oldest name is racism.

After that, it acquires better manners.

A raised eyebrow.
A careful insinuation.
The question asked again after it has been answered.
The doubt that follows you from room to room.

Until a life becomes an endless defence of itself.

This is how a soul is pillaged:

not always in one great violence,
but piece by piece, certainty by certainty,
breath by breath- until even breathing
must produce evidence
of innocence.

And now grief comeswith questions
we are too late to ask.

Did we stand close enough when the hounds began circling?

Did we hear the hunt beneath the language of scrutiny, standards, concern?

There is shame here.

Let it remain.

Not the shame of the hunted.
Never that.

The shame belongs to the hunt.

And there is regret.

Mountains of  regret.

Regret is such a useless country.
Every road ends at the same locked door:

if only.

 

(by Lebohang Liepollo Pheko)
(Image Credit 1: Ad Reinhardt, Abstract Painting / Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum)
(Image Credit 2: Lebohang Liepollo Pheko)

 

In an age of exile … this is not your home

In Cape Town, the Zeitz Museum of Contemporary Art Africa is currently showing an exhibition entitled A Protea Is Not a Flower, which considers the works of Gerard Sekoto, Bessie Head and Don Mattera, apartheid-era artists who struggled with various modes of exile. Zeitz describes the exhibit as follows: “A Protea Is Not a Flower is a multigenerational conversation between South African artists and writers whose lives and works contend with the complexity of the exilic experience …. The exhibition explores the spectrum of personal and political expression, navigating themes of exile, identity, and memory.” Exactly what is the vehicle, engine or pilot that “navigates” exile?

Exile is not estrangement. Exile is, as it was from its inception, banishment, and although “self-imposed exile” is a common enough phrase, in fact exile is never self-imposed: “No one leaves home unless home is the mouth of a shark.” Despite phrases like “government in exile”, there is no return from exile. Exile is and always has meant banishment. The ancient Roman lawmakers understood this. For them, exile was an “alternative” to capital punishment, or, at least, that’s how it’s understood today. Actually, exile wasn’t alternative, it was synonymous. Exile came with an administrative decree, interdictio aquae et ignis, “interdiction of water and fire”. This decree declared that anyone who ran into an exile within the borders of the country was encouraged to kill him or her. That is not an alternative to capital punishment. No water, no shelter, no warmth, no hope. Exile today has the same design and intent as exile in the past, death-in-life.

The categories of exile are numerous, perhaps infinite, and growing. Refugees. Forced migrants. Internally displaced. Those fleeing persecution, conflict, violence, or human rights violations; “those fleeing” are those forced to flee. Forced to flee climate change, weather-related disasters, and other “natural disasters”, such as wildfires, earthquakes, tsunamis, and the list goes on. Some are forced to flee epidemics. Others are forced to flee mass displacement caused by “development”. No one is fleeing, everyone is forced to flee.

This isn’t “just about” where you live, it concerns where you are, where you are yourself. Millions are counted as unable to return home. In an age of “self-deportation” and “self-eviction”, in order to avoid greater harm today and in the future, millions more who can’t return are uncounted, by the agencies, the State, the media. They are all in exile.

Gerard Sekoto was born in 1913 in what was then the Eastern Transvaal, in what is now Mpumalanga. From an early age, he studied to be an artist. He spent his early adulthood as a teacher and then devoted himself fully to the visual arts. In 1938, at the age of 25, he left for Johannesburg. In 1947, an accomplished artist, he fled South Africa, never to return. He lived and worked and came to renown in Paris, where he died in 1993. He never returned … because he couldn’t. South Africa, though in his soul and bones, was not his.

In 1942, the American poet Karl Shapiro, in the midst of World War II, wrote “Travelogue for Exiles”. The poem is three stanzas; the third reads:

Look and remember. Look upon this land,
Far, far across the factories and the grass.
Surely, there, surely they will let you pass.
Speak then and ask the forest and the loam.
What do you hear? What does the land command?
The earth is taken: this is not your home.

The earth is taken: this is not your home …

 

(By Dan Moshenberg)

(Image Credit: Gerard Sekoto. “The Sharpeville Massacre” / BBC / Gerard Sekoto Foundation)

Afrikan Football Economy Subsidising the World

Scholarship on Afrikan football has increasingly moved beyond celebratory narratives of sporting success towards a more critical examination of football as a political and economic institution. Scholarship has increasingly located Afrikan football within wider histories of colonialism, labour migration, commercialisation and global governance (Akindes; Cornelissen; Darby). Yet most studies begin with migration or professional contracts.

Recent Afrikan-centred writing on football has begun to name this contradiction more clearly. Gerard Akindesasks whether Afrikan countries can dominate global football while losing control of their own game, locating contemporary football within a longer history of globalisation, migration, commodification and institutional dependence. This framing is useful because it avoids two common simplifications: the romantic claim that global football is simply opportunity, and the reductive claim that Afrikan players are merely victims. The more precise question is how Afrikan talent becomes incorporated into global football markets, and who controls the institutions that convert that talent into enduring value.

Every time we watch the UEFA Champions League, we see twenty-two footballers. We rarely see the thousands of people employed because those twenty-two players exist: physiotherapists, nutritionists, AI analysts, statisticians, broadcasters, lawyers, hotel workers, camera operators, journalists, betting companies, sportswear manufacturers and software engineers. Football is not simply a sport. It is an industrial ecosystem. Europe did not become wealthy from football because it had the best players alone. It built the industries around them.

This market is racialised. Afrikan players are often described through a vocabulary of pace, power, hunger, instinct and resilience, while European football institutions are associated with intelligence, discipline, tactics, science and development. Such language is not neutral.  It presents Afrikan footballers as raw athletic material requiring refinement elsewhere, while obscuring the labour already invested by Afrikan families, schools, communities, coaches and academies. Talent is not raw. It is socially produced.

The racialised industry of exporting sporting talent also extends beyond football. Afrikan athletes have long been central to global markets in athletics, rugby, basketball and combat sports. Football, however, provides the clearest case because its transfer fees, media rights and commercial revenues make the commodification of human capability highly visible. A young player may leave an Afrikan academy with limited immediate market value, then appreciate dramatically after entering European club systems, global broadcast markets and elite competitions. The question is not whether the player benefits. Many do. The question is where the largest share of appreciation accumulates.

This is why the language of “talent drain” is insufficient. Afrikan footballers are not simply lost to Europe and other parts of the world. They become part of a global value chain in which European clubs, Gulf investors, international broadcasters, sponsors, data firms and governing bodies capture different layers of value. The player is labour, but also asset, brand, media content, transfer commodity and speculative investment.

The 2026 FIFA World Cup makes this visible. European and North American teams increasingly rely on Afrikan and Afrikan-diaspora footballers. France, Belgium, Portugal,  Germany, England , Canada and the US all illustrate the extent to which Afrikan and migrant capability has become embedded in national football projects beyond the continent. This should not  always be read simply as loss: diaspora players often maintain powerful ties to Afrikan identities, communities and national teams. But it demonstrates that Afrikan footballing labour circulates through multiple national projects while the commercial infrastructure remains concentrated elsewhere.

This is also where football’s colonial geographies remain visible. Recruitment corridors linking Senegal and Mali to France, Ghana to Belgium, Nigeria to England, Morocco to Spain and France, and ‘Lusophone’ Afrika to Portugal are shaped by language, migration regimes, earlier colonial relations and existing institutional networks. Football does not mechanically reproduce colonialism, but it often travels along routes that colonialism and postcolonial migration helped build.

The geography of capital is also changing. European clubs remain central, but Gulf capital has become increasingly influential. Qatar’s Aspire Academy has run extensive talent identification programmes in Afrika. Gulf-based media and sponsorship networks have also become significant to Afrikan football governance. CAF’s long-term broadcasting deal with beIN Media Group, reported at roughly US$415 million, and the staging of marquee Afrikan football events in Saudi Arabia show how Afrikan football is increasingly positioned within wider geopolitical and commercial strategies. The axis is therefore no longer simply Afrika-Europe. It now involves Afrikan talent, European football institutions, Gulf capital, global media and FIFA/CAF governance.

Scarlett Cornelissen’s work on sport mega-events in Afrika is useful here because it treats sport not as entertainment but as part of global capitalism, state ambition and geopolitical positioning. Her analysis of sport mega-events shows how Afrikan states and institutions enter global sport through promises of development, visibility and modernisation, while the actual distribution of economic benefit remains uneven. This helps frame football as an institutional economy rather than a cultural spectacle.

My  recent football writing also extends this analysis by linking FIFA, empire, anti-Blackness, securitisation and the capture of the “beautiful game.” In Fortress Football, I argue that football’s global spectacle cannot be separated from borders, policing, racism, exclusion and the corporate enclosure of spaces built by working-class and racialised communities. This article builds from that argument but shifts the focus from mega-events and access to the prior question of production: how Afrikan human capability is produced, commodified and absorbed into global football’s value chain.

The political economy is therefore not adequately captured by saying that Europe “takes” Afrikan players. The structure is more complex. Afrikan families, communities and institutions contribute substantially to producing footballing capability. European clubs and increasingly Gulf-linked capital identify, purchase, develop and commercialise that capability. FIFA and CAF govern the rules of circulation. Global media platforms and sponsors monetise the spectacle. Domestic Afrikan leagues, however, often remain undercapitalised, administratively fragile and commercially marginal relative to the value produced by Afrikan footballers abroad.

The developmental question is not whether Afrikan players should migrate. It is whether Afrikan football economies can build institutions capable of retaining a greater share of the value generated by their own human capability.

Afrika’s Hidden Subsidy to Global Football

The scale of Afrika’s contribution to global football is no longer anecdotal. It is measurable.CIES Football Observatory data show that international football migration has continued to rise, with expatriate players reaching a new record in 2024 across 135 men’s leagues in 88 national associations. Between 2020 and 2025, Nigeria recorded one of the largest increases in expatriate footballers globally, rising by 181 players, behind only France and Argentina. Earlier research on Afrikan football migration found that more than 500 male Afrikan players were active in Europe’s eleven biggest leagues in the 2021/22 season, with Senegal, Morocco, Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana among the leading sending countries.

Afrika’s contribution to world football is not only cultural or sporting. It is also financial, although much of that finance never appears in football’s official accounts.

It is difficult to place an exact monetary value on this subsidy because most of it takes the form of unpaid care, informal community investment and public expenditure spread across many institutions. But the scale can be approximated from the value captured later. European football generated a record €38 billion in revenue in 2023/24, with the big five leagues alone contributing more than €20 billion. Afrikan players are active across these leagues in significant numbers. Earlier estimates placed the number of Afrikan players in Europe’s eleven biggest leagues at more than 500, with Senegal, Morocco and Nigeria alone contributing 62, 55 and 54 players respectively in 2021/22.

If Afrikan players constitute even a modest share of the labour force sustaining this €38 billion industry, their economic contribution runs into billions annually. This does not mean those billions can be mechanically attributed to Afrika alone. Football value is jointly produced by clubs, coaches, broadcasters, sponsors, supporters and competitions. But it does mean that Afrikan labour and Afrikan social investment are embedded within one of Europe’s most profitable cultural industries.

The transfer system gives us another way to see the imbalance. FIFA’s solidarity mechanism recognises that player development is cumulative by allocating up to 5% of a transfer fee to clubs involved in training a player between roughly the ages of 12 and 23. That 5% is important, but it also reveals the problem. Even when properly paid, it recognises only a narrow institutional slice of development. It does not compensate mothers, schools, communities, municipal facilities, national youth systems or the years of unpaid and underpaid labour through which the athlete was produced.

Consider the arithmetic. On a €75 million transfer, 5% solidarity compensation amounts to €3.75 million distributed across eligible training clubs. The remaining €71.25 million circulates through selling clubs, buying clubs, agents, wages, taxes and associated commercial structures. The Afrikan social investment that made the player possible is acknowledged, if at all, only indirectly and partially.

This is why the language of subsidy matters. Afrika is not merely exporting footballers. It is helping finance the early production of a global football labour force whose highest commercial returns are realised elsewhere. The subsidy is hidden because it is dispersed across households, communities and underfunded local institutions rather than recorded in the ledgers of UEFA clubs, FIFA, broadcasters or sponsors.

The developmental loss is therefore larger than the departure of individual players. Afrikan leagues lose potential stars who could increase ticket sales, domestic broadcasting value, sponsorship markets, youth participation, football journalism, sports medicine, coaching jobs, data analytics, merchandising and tourism. In this sense, Afrika exports not only players but future football economies.

This does not mean Afrikan players should be prevented from migrating. Mobility has transformed lives and created enormous opportunities. The question is whether Afrikan football institutions can capture a fairer share of the value that Afrikan societies help produce.

Accumulation, Value Capture and the Afrikan Football Economy

Political economy distinguishes between the production of value and its consumption. These are not synonymous. Countries may produce indispensable commodities while capturing only a small share of the wealth generated through their circulation. Contemporary debates on global value chains have demonstrated that the highest returns increasingly accrue not through production alone but through ownership, finance, branding, technology, logistics, intellectual property and control over distribution. Football demonstrates these dynamics with remarkable clarity.

Victor Osimhen did not become a €75 million footballer overnight. Long before Napoli paid one of the largest transfer fees ever for an Afrikan player, his value had already been patiently assembled. It had been built by his mother, by neighbourhood football in Lagos, by years of coaching, by school competitions, by the Nigerian football system and by the communities that sustained him. Napoli did not purchase a raw talent. It purchased nearly two decades of accumulated social investment whose greatest commercial appreciation was still to come.

The global football economy is now estimated to generate well over US$60 billion annually, while European professional football alone generates annual revenues exceeding €38 billion. The “Big Five” European leagues account for the overwhelming share of broadcasting income, commercial sponsorship, merchandising, hospitality and global media revenues.

Afrikan footballers contribute substantially to this commercial ecosystem. Players from Nigeria, Senegal, Morocco, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Cameroon, Algeria and South Afrika feature prominently across Europe’s leading competitions, while Afrikan-born and Afrikan-diaspora players have become central to the competitive success of clubs in England, France, Spain, Italy, Germany, Belgium, Portugal and increasingly North America. Their performances generate value far beyond wages or transfer fees. They contribute to television audiences, global merchandising, sponsorship contracts, digital engagement, tourism, betting markets, licensing agreements and club valuations.

The issue, therefore, is not whether Afrikan footballers are rewarded. Many are among the world’s highest-paid athletes. The question asked by the  political economy is different. Which institutions capture the greatest share of the wealth they help generate?

The answer lies in football’s institutional architecture.

Elite clubs own the contracts through which player value is realised. Broadcasters own the media rights through which audiences are monetised. Sportswear corporations commercialise global identities through branding and merchandising. Data analytics firms transform player performance into proprietary information. Betting companies derive profits from football’s uncertainty, while digital platforms monetise fan engagement through subscription models and advertising. Governing bodies regulate entry into these markets, while sponsors convert sporting visibility into commercial advantage.

The footballer remains indispensable to each of these processes.

Yet the footballer is only one participant within a much larger ecosystem of accumulation.

This distinction has profound implications for Afrika. Domestic leagues continue to experience comparatively low broadcasting revenues, limited commercial sponsorship, weaker sports infrastructure and constrained institutional investment relative to European football. As Gerard Akindes argues, Afrika has become increasingly integrated into the global football economy while remaining structurally disadvantaged within its most profitable segments. The result is not the absence of Afrikan participation but its concentration within labour-intensive stages of the football value chain, while ownership of higher-value activities remains disproportionately located elsewhere.

The developmental challenge therefore extends beyond player migration. It concerns industrial organisation. Europe has spent decades constructing dense football ecosystems comprising professional coaching, sports medicine, biomechanics, nutrition, artificial intelligence, performance analytics, legal services, financial management, sports media, marketing, hospitality, event management and advanced broadcasting industries. Football has become an industrial cluster whose economic significance extends far beyond the ninety minutes played on the field.

This insight has received insufficient attention within Afrikan development debates. Football is too often understood either as entertainment or as a source of national prestige. It is neither alone. It is an economic sector capable of generating employment, technological innovation, research, tourism, manufacturing, creative industries and financial services. The export of footballers therefore represents only one component of a much larger economy.

This article argues that Afrika’s strategic challenge is not to reduce football migration. Rather, it is to reposition Afrikan football within higher-value segments of the industry’s global value chain. This requires investment not only in players but also in domestic leagues, coaching systems, sports science, sports medicine, broadcasting, digital media, data analytics, legal expertise, intellectual property, women’s football, sports manufacturing and commercial management. It also requires stronger institutions capable of negotiating media rights, protecting young players, enforcing solidarity payments and retaining a greater share of football’s economic surplus within Afrikan economies.

As I argued in recent analyses of FIFA, the World Cup and the global football economy, contemporary sport mirrors wider patterns of global capitalism in which Afrika contributes indispensable human capability while ownership over finance, governance, media and commercial infrastructure remains concentrated elsewhere. Football therefore offers more than a sporting case study. It reveals a broader political economy in which the central developmental question is not whether Afrika creates value, but whether it possesses the institutions necessary to retain, compound and govern that value.

Football as an Industrial Ecosystem

Football’s political economy extends far beyond the labour of the player. An elite club is not simply a team. It is a complex economic ecosystem.

Around every first-team squad sits a large workforce. The match is only the most visible part of the economy. The larger value lies in the industries that surround it.

The scale is substantial. Deloitte estimates that the top twenty football clubs in the world generated more than €12 billion in revenue for the first time in the 2024/25 season.

These revenues are not generated by players alone. They come from broadcasting, commercial partnerships, matchday income, museums, hospitality, restaurants, stadium tours, retail, licensing, sponsorship, digital media and global brand management. Deloitte reported that matchday revenue for the top clubs surpassed €2.1 billion in 2023/24, driven by larger stadiums, premium hospitality and year-round commercial use of club facilities.

The employment effect is equally important. An EY study for the Premier League found that in the 2023/24 season, the League and its clubs generated £9.8 billion in gross value added to the UK economy, supported more than 100,000 full-time equivalent jobs and contributed £4.4 billion in tax. These are not only football jobs. They include transport, tourism, security, hospitality, broadcasting, retail, construction, media, legal services, finance and local supply chains.

Afrikan players on the pitch are therefore only one node in a much larger economy. This is what Afrikan football  is not yet capturing at scale. Afrikan countries contribute substantially to the football labour that sustains this global economy, but the surrounding industrial ecosystem is still largely located elsewhere. Europe and increasingly Gulf-backed football capital capture value not only through players but through the entire architecture around them: sports medicine, performance analytics, broadcasting, licensing, tourism, betting, merchandising, apparel, stadium real estate, image rights, finance and legal services.

This matters because the developmental loss is not only the player who leaves. It is the absence of the industries that could have grown around him. A domestic league capable of retaining elite players for longer could support jobs in sports medicine, coaching, media, kit production, stadium management, sports law, fan tourism, data analytics and digital content. A stronger football economy would not only employ footballers. It would employ thousands of people who may never touch the ball.

Afrika therefore subsidises global football twice. First, through the social investment that produces footballers. Second, through the lost industrial ecosystems that are built around those footballers elsewhere.

The article has followed the political economy of that footballer across successive stages of value creation. Drawing on Gerard Akindes’ work on the globalisation of Afrikan football and Iwebunor Okwechime’s analysis of Afrikan football labour migration, the article demonstrated how Afrikan capability is incorporated into international recruitment systems, transfer markets and global football value chains that increasingly operate across Europe, North America and the Gulf. (Afrikasacountry.com; Okwechime, 2019)

The empirical evidence reinforces this argument. CIES Football Observatory data consistently identify Nigeria, Senegal, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Morocco, Mali and Cameroon among the world’s leading exporters of professional footballers. Deloitte estimates that European football generated approximately €38 billion in revenue during the 2023/24 season, while the top twenty clubs generated more than €12 billion in annual revenues. FIFA’s transfer regulations, solidarity mechanisms and training compensation rules further acknowledge that football talent is produced cumulatively across multiple institutions, even if they recognise only a small fraction of that developmental investment. Collectively, these data demonstrate that Afrikan footballers are indispensable contributors to one of the world’s largest cultural and entertainment industries. Yet the greatest commercial returns continue to accrue through ownership of clubs, broadcasting rights, commercial partnerships, sports technology, intellectual property and financial services rather than through player production alone.

Conclusion

This article has argued that Afrikan country contributions to global football extends far beyond the export of talented players. Afrikan societies contribute one of the game’s most valuable resources: the continual production of world-class human capability. Yet the greatest economic returns generated by that capability are largely realised elsewhere, through clubs, broadcasters, sponsors, governing bodies, sports technology, finance and the wider commercial ecosystem that surrounds the modern game.

Understanding football through this wider political economy shifts attention away from transfer fees alone towards the institutions through which value is accumulated, retained and compounded. The transfer market represents only one moment within a much larger system of wealth creation. Long before players generate commercial returns on the pitch, Afrikan households, communities, local clubs and public institutions have already invested in the capabilities upon which the global game depends. Long after players retire, meanwhile, the greatest value increasingly lies beyond the player—in broadcasting rights, data, merchandising, sports medicine, intellectual property, finance and global media.

The central question is therefore not whether Afrikan countries can continue producing exceptional footballers. It clearly can. The more pressing question is whether Afrika can participate more fully in the industries that surround football itself. The future of Afrikan football will depend not only on developing players but on building stronger domestic leagues, retaining commercial rights, expanding coaching and sports science, investing in digital technologies and data, strengthening governance and creating regional football industries capable of capturing more of the value that Afrikan talents and capability already generates.

Afrika has never been peripheral to the global game. It has been one of its principal producers. The challenge now is to move beyond supplying football labour towards shaping, owning and benefiting from the broader football economy itself.

The question is whether Afrikan countries can increasingly own, govern and expand the football economies that their societies have helped to create.

Answering that question requires moving beyond the political economy of talent extraction towards a political economy of institutional ownership, regional industrial development and Afrikan value capture. Only then can football become not merely one of Afrika’s greatest exports, but one of its most important engines of structural transformation.

(By Liepollo Lebohang Pheko)

(Image Credit: Clint Strydom, “Transkei (4)” / Clint Strydom Photography)

Before the Transfer: Speculative Childhood and How Afrika Sustains the Global Football Economy

Introduction

Football is not exceptional because it commodifies childhood; it is exceptional because it makes visible processes of anticipation that increasingly characterise capitalism more broadly. Like many extractive global industries, football systematically values the commodity while obscuring the labour, care and social infrastructures that produce it.

Scholarship on Afrikan football has increasingly moved beyond celebratory narratives of sporting success towards more critical analyses of football as a political and economic institution. Scholars have situated Afrikan football within broader histories of colonialism, labour migration, commercialisation and global governance (Akindes, 2011; Cornelissen, 2011; Darby, 2007). Yet most studies begin with migration or professional contracts. This article argues that the political economy of Afrikan football begins much earlier: in childhood itself. This is long before migration or professional contracts. I describe this phenomenon as speculative childhood.

Speculative childhood refers to the incorporation of children’s future productive capacity into circuits of commercial calculation, institutional competition and financial anticipation long before they become professional workers. The concept does not imply that football academies are inherently exploitative or that international sporting careers should be discouraged. Rather, it identifies a structural shift in which childhood itself increasingly becomes subject to market valuation.

Elite football like most sports increasingly operates through this anticipation of future value. Across West, North and Southern Afrika, children are identified, monitored and evaluated through academy systems, scouting tournaments, private intermediaries and transnational recruitment networks years before they are eligible to enter professional football. Although FIFA’s Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Playersprohibit most international transfers of minors, the commercial identification of talent frequently begins much earlier. Childhood therefore becomes incorporated into a global economy organised around projected future productivity rather than present performance. The frontier of extraction has shifted. Increasingly, it is not only Afrika’s land, minerals or labour that are anticipated by global markets, but Afrikan childhood itself.

Rather, it identifies a structural transformation in which childhood itself increasingly acquires economic value through the anticipation of future performance as Twum -Danso outlines(Twum-Danso Imoh, 2013; 2020 ).

Drawing on feminist political economy, Afrikan political economy and critical childhood studies, this article  utilises ‘speculative childhood’ theory to explain how Afrikan boyhood becomes incorporated into the global football economy long before young players enter professional labour markets. By foregrounding social reproduction rather than transfer markets, it shows that football talent is not discovered but collectively produced through years of unpaid care, community investment and public provision. The work  engages with  contemporary scholarship by Awino Okech, Sara Salem, Yolande Bouka, Shirin Rai and Bina Agarwal on power, social reproduction, mobility and care under contemporary capitalism (Okech, 2020; Salem, 2020; Bouka, 2021; Rai, 2013; Agarwal, 1997).

Although childhood has long been recognised as socially and economically constructed, this article departs from existing scholarship by foregrounding anticipation rather than exchange. Viviana Zelizer’s  pioneering work demonstrated that children have long occupied complex positions within economic life rather than existing outside markets (Zelizer, 1985). This article extends that insight by arguing that contemporary football increasingly commodifies not children’s present labour but their anticipated future capability. What is being valued is not the child as worker but the possibility that the child may one day become commercially valuable.

Football provides one of the clearest illustrations of this transformation. Across West, North, East and Southern Afrika, boys are identified through grassroots tournaments, academies, school competitions, private intermediaries and transnational scouting networks years before they are eligible to play professionally. Although FIFA regulations prohibit most international transfers of minors, the commercial identification of talent begins much earlier. The object of investment is no longer simply the professional footballer; it is the future footballer. Childhood itself becomes incorporated into a global economy organised around projected future productivity.

The consequences extend beyond sport. Football is now one of the few global industries in which large numbers of Afrikan boys are recognised not primarily as future citizens, students or workers, but as future financial assets. Families invest scarce household resources in training, travel and equipment. Communities organise around the promise of exceptional talent. Scouts, academies and agents compete to identify potential before rivals do. Hope itself becomes economically organised. Yet while the possibility of extraordinary success receives considerable attention, far less scrutiny has been given to the unequal distribution of the risks that accompany this speculative economy.

Understanding those risks requires shifting our analytical lens from football markets to the social worlds that produce footballers. Before an Afrikan player becomes commercially valuable, years of unpaid and under-recognised labour have already been invested by mothers, families, schools, local clubs, coaches, neighbourhoods and public institutions. The football economy depends upon these forms of social reproduction, yet they remain almost entirely absent from football’s financial accounting. Patricia McFadden, Sara Salem, Shirin Rai and Bina Agarwal remind us of this (McFadden, 1992; Salem, 2020; Rai, 2013; Agarwal, 1997). The transfer fee recognises the player only after the most fundamental work has already been done.

This article therefore makes three interconnected arguments. First, it argues that Afrikan boyhood has become increasingly incorporated into a speculative economy in which children’s futures are valued long before they become professional athletes. Second, drawing on feminist political economy, it shows that football talent is not naturally endowed but socially produced through extensive processes of care, education and community investment that remain economically invisible. Finally, it argues that the unequal distribution of risk and reward begins in childhood itself: Afrikan families and communities absorb the costs and uncertainties of producing football talent, while the greatest commercial returns are realised elsewhere. In this sense, the global football economy reproduces a familiar colonial political economy: Afrika finances the production of value while others retain the institutions through which that value is accumulated.

By relocating the political economy of football to childhood rather than migration, this article shifts attention from the transfer market to the production of human capability itself. Before there is a contract, there is a child. Before there is a transfer fee, there are years of care, sacrifice and social investment. The global football economy begins not at the moment a player leaves Afrika, but at the moment Afrikan boyhood becomes an object of economic anticipation.

Speculative Childhood: The Political Economy of Anticipation

Most analyses of Afrikan football begin when young players enter professional labour markets through migration, academy recruitment or international transfers. While these approaches have generated important insights into labour mobility, exploitation and global sporting inequalities they begin their analysis only after the most significant political-economic work has already taken place (Darby, 2007; Akindes, 2011; Cornelissen, 2011). By the time a young Afrikan footballer signs a professional contract, years of investment, evaluation and social reproduction have already transformed him into a commercially desirable asset.

This article therefore shifts the analytical starting point from migration to childhood. It argues that the incorporation of children’s future productive capacity into circuits of commercial calculation, institutional competition and financial anticipation long before they become professional workers. The market no longer waits for footballers to emerge. It actively seeks to identify, evaluate and secure future value while that value is still embodied in children.

This speculative logic has become central to elite football. Across West, North, East and Southern Afrika, boys are identified through school tournaments, neighbourhood competitions, academy trials, youth leagues and increasingly sophisticated scouting networks. Their technical ability, physical growth, athletic potential and psychological attributes are monitored years before they are legally eligible to sign professional contracts. Clubs, intermediaries and academies compete not simply for talented players but for the possibility of future appreciation. Like financial investors purchasing assets before they mature, football institutions seek to secure talent before its market value escalates.

Importantly, speculative childhood does not imply that football academies are inherently exploitative or that international careers should be discouraged. Many academies provide high-quality coaching, education and opportunities that have transformed the lives of thousands of Afrikan players and their families. Nor does every young footballer become subject to commercial exploitation. Rather, the concept draws attention to a broader structural transformation in which childhood itself increasingly becomes organised around anticipated future economic value.

Football is particularly revealing because its speculative dynamics are unusually visible. Unlike many other sectors, football openly assigns monetary values to future potential through scouting systems, academy recruitment, transfer markets and player development pathways. Yet similar dynamics increasingly characterise other areas of the contemporary economy, where children are assessed, ranked and cultivated according to their projected future productivity. Football therefore provides a powerful lens through which to examine wider processes of commodification under contemporary capitalism.

The Afrikan context gives this process particular significance. The continent has become one of the world’s most important producers of elite football talent, supplying players to leagues across Europe, North America, the Gulf and increasingly Asia. Yet the identification of this talent begins long before migration. Across neighbourhood pitches, municipal leagues and local academies, Afrikan boys are increasingly viewed through the language of potential, promise and future value.   not simply observe children playing football; they assess future market possibilities often parading them online disturbingly, like chattel.  The gaze is not neutral. It is organised through a political economy that increasingly treats Afrikan boys as repositories of future commercial value.

The consequences are profound. Once a boy is recognised as possessing exceptional footballing potential, his childhood is often reorganised around that possibility. Schooling, family finances, mobility, daily routines and community expectations increasingly orient themselves towards a future professional career that remains statistically improbable. The child is not yet a worker, yet his future labour has already begun to shape present decisions. His value lies less in who he is today than in who markets believe he may become tomorrow.

Football migration does not occur across a neutral global landscape. Recruitment networks have developed through layered histories of empire, language, migration policy, diaspora formation and institutional relationships that continue to shape contemporary football markets. In some cases, these routes clearly reflect colonial histories, as seen in longstanding recruitment links between Senegal and France, Mali and France, Morocco and France or Spain, and Lusophone Afrikan countries and Portugal. In other cases, contemporary pathways are less directly colonial and are instead organised through the commercial strategies of academies, intermediary clubs, migration regimes, linguistic affinities, established diasporas and global scouting networks.

The geography of Afrikan football migration is therefore best understood not as a simple continuation of colonialism, but as an evolving infrastructure in which historical imperial connections intersect with newer commercial and institutional forms of global football governance. Empire did not disappear from football; it changed organisational form. Colonial infrastructures have been reconfigured into commercial recruitment infrastructures.

This speculative orientation fundamentally alters how we understand the political economy of Afrikan football. Rather than beginning with migration, the global football economy begins with anticipation. Before there is a transfer fee, there is projection. Before there is a contract, there is expectation. Before there is a professional footballer, there is an Afrikan boy whose future has already entered the calculations of families, scouts, academies and global football markets.

Producing the Footballer: Social Reproduction and our Mothers

The speculative economy of football obscures a more fundamental question: where does a footballer come from? Elite football often presents talent as something that is discovered—a rare gift identified by scouts and refined through professional coaching. This language of discovery conceals the long social process through which footballers are actually produced. Before an Afrikan boy is recognised by an academy or signs his first professional contract, years of unpaid labour, public investment and collective care have already shaped the capabilities that later acquire commercial value.

Feminist political economists have long argued that economies depend upon forms of labour that remain systematically undervalued because they occur outside conventional markets. Patricia McFadden and  Rama Salla Dieng remind us that human capability is neither spontaneous nor naturally occurring (McFadden, 1992; Dieng, 2022). It is produced through the everyday work of social reproduction: feeding children, caring for illness, supporting education, maintaining households, nurturing confidence, building communities and sustaining the conditions under which human beings are able to flourish. Markets depend upon this labour, yet rarely recognise or reward it. What remains invisible in football accounting is not incidental; it is precisely the hidden subsidy upon which profitable accumulation depends.

Football offers a striking illustration of this insight. Before an Afrikan boy ever appears before a scout across sports, countless people have already contributed to his development. Mothers wake before dawn to prepare meals and uniforms. Fathers, grandparents and extended families find money for boots, transport and tournament fees despite precarious household incomes. The feminist economics of this process are particularly important  including the labour that makes  transfers possible ((Agarwal, 1997; McFadden, 1992) Much of the labour that sustains aspiring footballers is undertaken by women whose work remains both unpaid and unrecognised. Mothers and grandmothers frequently become the logistical and emotional infrastructure of football careers, organising household budgets around training schedules, travelling long distances to matches, preparing food, washing kits and sustaining children through inevitable disappointments and injuries. Teachers accommodate absences for competitions. School coaches volunteer evenings and weekends. Community clubs organise leagues on poorly maintained municipal pitches. Public schools provide spaces in which sporting talent first emerges, while clinics and public health systems help maintain children’s physical wellbeing. Neighbours, siblings and friends contribute time, encouragement and emotional support. These investments rarely appear in football’s financial accounting, yet they are indispensable to the production of football talent. Global football therefore reproduces the oldest logic of capitalism: the systematic appropriation of Black women’s reproductive labour without equivalent recognition or remuneration.

Football talent, then, is not an individual possession. Nor is it simply a biological gift waiting to be discovered. It is a socially produced capability. Every successful footballer embodies years of collective labour undertaken largely outside the market. The global football economy depends upon this labour while simultaneously rendering it invisible.

This invisibility reflects a broader pattern within global capitalism. As feminist political economy has consistently demonstrated, the costs of producing human capability are frequently borne by households and communities, while the returns are realised elsewhere. Football reproduces this logic with remarkable clarity. Afrikan families absorb the costs of raising children. Local clubs invest years in coaching and player development. Public institutions contribute education, healthcare and sporting infrastructure. Yet the greatest commercial returns are often captured only after the player enters international football markets.

Their labour is indispensable to the production of football talent, yet it disappears entirely once that talent enters commercial markets. Transfer fees compensate clubs and agents; they do not recognise the years of care that made those transfers possible. As Bina Agarwal has argued in different development contexts, household provisioning is not simply an economic activity but one deeply shaped by unequal access to resources, decision-making power and social norms ((Agarwal, 1997). Football illustrates these dynamics vividly. Women frequently absorb the hidden costs of producing future footballers while remaining entirely absent from football’s commercial accounting.

Nor is social reproduction confined to the household. Across Afrika, football is deeply embedded within neighbourhoods, churches, schools, youth clubs and informal associations that create spaces in which boys develop technical ability, discipline, confidence and collective identity. These institutions perform far more than recreational functions. They cultivate forms of human capability that later underpin one of the world’s most lucrative sporting industries. The production of football talent is therefore not simply an individual achievement but a collective social accomplishment.

Recognising football as socially reproduced also changes how we understand value itself. Conventional football economics tends to locate value at the moment of transfer or contract, when players acquire an explicit market price. A feminist political economy perspective suggests a different chronology. The most important investments occur long before the market assigns monetary value. By the time a European club purchases an Afrikan footballer, the most labour-intensive stage of production has already been completed. What appears as the acquisition of talent is, in reality, the acquisition of years of accumulated social investment.

Seen in this light, the familiar claim that Afrika “exports talent” is profoundly incomplete. Afrika does not simply export footballers. It exports socially produced human capability and, with it, the cumulative investments of households, communities and systems of care (McFadden, 1992; Ossome, 2021; Salem, 2020).

It also exports value already created. Europe purchases finished capability while rarely paying the full social costs of its production. Embedded within every player are years of unpaid care, public expenditure, community commitment and institutional investment that remain largely invisible once the footballer enters global circuits of commercial accumulation. Before Europe discovers talent, Afrikan societies have already created it.

This perspective also reframes the political economy of football migration. The central issue is not merely that players leave the continent. It is that the costs of producing football talent and the rewards generated by that talent are geographically and institutionally separated. Afrikan households and communities shoulder the uncertainties of development, while global football increasingly captures the returns. Understanding this separation requires us to move beyond the language of talent alone and towards the politics of social reproduction, where the real foundations of football’s global economy are laid.

The Unequal Burden of Hope: Speculative Football Economy

Speculative childhood redistributes more than economic value; it redistributes risk. While elite football clubs diversify uncertainty across hundreds of young prospects, Afrikan households often concentrate that uncertainty within a single child. In many communities, one gifted boy comes to embody not only his own aspirations but also the hopes of an extended family. Football becomes more than a game. It becomes an imagined pathway out of poverty, unemployment and structural exclusion. This also carries  gender stratified impacts. Scholars of Afrikan masculinities, including Kopano Ratele, Robert Morrell and Tamara Shefer, have shown how boys frequently come to understand successful adulthood through expectations of provision, achievement and responsibility (Ratele, 2016; Morrell, 2001; Shefer, 2017). Football intensifies these expectations by presenting exceptional sporting success as one of the few globally visible pathways through which young men might fulfil these socially constructed obligations. This burden of expectation, as Tamara Shefer and Yolande Bouka variously demonstrate in different contexts, is inseparable from the broader political economy(Shefer, 2017; Bouka, 2021).

Across much of the continent, young men confront persistently high rates of unemployment, shrinking opportunities for secure work and education systems that often struggle to translate qualifications into livelihoods. In this context, elite football appears to offer one of the few globally visible routes to social mobility. Families do not simply invest in football because they love the game. They invest because the alternatives are often profoundly constrained. Hope itself becomes financialised, transforming aspiration into one of the most powerful yet least recognised mechanisms through which unequal global markets reproduce themselves. Although this article focuses on the Afrika region Afrikan  countries are not  alone in converting racialised aspiration into sporting labour. Across Brazil and Latin America, and within Black communities in the United States, families similarly invest hope in sons (and daughters)whose bodies and capabilities may offer one of the few visible routes to mobility. These sporting economies are rooted in different but connected histories of slavery, colonialism, segregation and racial capitalism: communities produce the talent, absorb the risks and carry the losses, while institutions elsewhere retain control over the wealth.

The consequence is that boyhood itself becomes organised around possibility. Daily routines, schooling, family expenditure and social expectations increasingly revolve around football. Time that might otherwise be devoted to education, recreation or other forms of childhood becomes increasingly structured by training sessions, tournaments, travel and trials. Success promises extraordinary transformation. Failure can carry equally profound consequences.

One of the first casualties is often education. Many boys recruited into intensive academy systems, regional development programmes or overseas trials experience disrupted schooling or abandon formal education altogether in pursuit of professional careers that remain statistically improbable. While some academies provide excellent educational opportunities, many young players find themselves with limited qualifications should football not materialise. A childhood organised around one uncertain future may leave few alternatives when that future disappears.

The emotional and mental health consequences are equally significant. Adolescence is a critical period of psychological and social development, yet for many boys football gradually ceases to be an activity they enjoy and becomes the principal measure of their worth, identity and future. Selection can bring validation; rejection can produce profound experiences of grief, shame, anxiety, depression and identity loss after years in which football has become central to a young person’s sense of self. The pressures are intensified where entire families and communities have invested scarce financial resources and collective hope in one child. Boys may come to experience not only personal disappointment but a sense that they have failed those who sacrificed for them. The silence surrounding boys’ emotional wellbeing within elite football cultures, where resilience and toughness are often privileged over vulnerability, means that many struggle to seek support precisely when they need it most. Players released from academies frequently describe experiences of grief, shame, anxiety and identity loss after years in which football had become central to their sense of self. The families that have invested scarce resources may also experience disappointment , shame financial hardship,  societal pressure , further intensifying the emotional burden carried by the young player. As James Esson reminds us:

Football becomes more than a game. It becomes an imagined pathway out of poverty, unemployment and structural exclusion (Esson, 2015).

Migration compounds these vulnerabilities. Boys who leave home for academies or overseas trials must navigate unfamiliar languages, cultures and institutional environments during formative years of development. Separation from family networks can produce loneliness and isolation precisely when stable emotional support is most needed. Those who fail to secure contracts may return home carrying not only unrealised ambitions but also the weight of perceived failure within communities that had invested collective hope in their success.

Trafficking and the Shadow Football Economy

The speculative economy surrounding Afrikan football has also generated a shadow market that exploits the aspirations of boys and their families. Investigations by FIFPRO  (2023), the International Organization for Migration (IOM,2021) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2020) have documented how unlicensed agents, fraudulent academies and criminal intermediaries profit from the global demand for Afrikan football talent. Families are promised professional contracts, scholarships or trials in Europe in exchange for substantial fees, often selling livestock, land or borrowing money to finance what they believe is a child’s opportunity.

For many boys, these promises prove entirely fictitious. Some arrive in Europe or North Afrika to discover that no club is expecting them, no contract exists and no legal support has been arranged. Others are abandoned immediately after unsuccessful trials, left without accommodation, valid visas or financial resources. Unable to return home and fearful of admitting failure to families who have invested everything in them, some drift into undocumented migration, precarious labour or homelessness. In the most severe cases, investigative reports and international organisations have documented links between fraudulent football recruitment, traffickingnetworks and forced labour (see also Bouka,2021).

These practices should not be understood as unfortunate anomalies operating outside the football economy. Rather, they emerge from the same speculative logic that values future footballing potential before it materialises. Whenever children’s anticipated value becomes commercially significant, opportunities arise for actors willing to commodify hope itself. The trafficking of young footballers therefore represents not simply criminal behaviour but the darkest expression of a wider political economy that transforms Afrikan boyhood into an object of speculation

Importantly, these abuses should not obscure the many legitimate pathways through which Afrikan players migrate successfully to professional football. Most academies, clubs and licensed agents operate lawfully and potentially create good opportunities , for thousands of Afrikan youth. The point is not to criminalise football migration but to recognise that markets built around children’s future value inevitably create opportunities for exploitation unless robust systems of safeguarding, regulation and accountability are in place. Trafficking is not the opposite of the football economy; it is its shadow. Both emerge from the same exploitative, speculative valuation of Afrikan boyhood, although one operates within regulated markets and the other through criminal networks.

The existence of these abuses should not obscure the reality that most Afrikan football migration occurs through legitimate academies and regulated transfers. The point is rather that speculative childhood generates conditions in which exploitation becomes possible. Whenever future economic value is attached to children, markets emerge to profit from the hopes of families. The speculative economy therefore produces both extraordinary opportunities and profound vulnerabilities. Whenever futures become commodities, predation follows close behind.

Conclusion

James Esson names these unequal risks reveal a defining feature of the contemporary global football economy (Esson,2015). European clubs  minimise uncertainty by investing in large portfolios of young players, fully  and cynically aware that only a small proportion will ultimately succeed. Afrikan families, by contrast, often invest their limited financial resources, emotional energy and future aspirations in a single child. The probabilities may be similar, but the consequences are radically different. For the club, an unsuccessful prospect is one loss among many. For the family, it may represent years of sacrifice that cannot easily be recovered.

The football economy therefore socialises risk downward while concentrating reward upward. As indicated Afrikan families, communities and local institutions absorb the uncertainties of producing football talent, while the organisations that eventually commercialise that talent enter the process only after much of the developmental work has already been completed. Before the transfer market distributes wealth, childhood has already distributed risk.

Recognising this unequal burden of hope fundamentally changes how we understand both Afrikan football and Afrikan boyhood. The central question is no longer whether individual boys succeed or fail. It is why one of the world’s most profitable sporting industries continues to externalise the costs of producing football talent onto those least able to bear them. The celebrated mobility of the global game rests upon a quieter political economy in which care, sacrifice and social reproduction are systematically appropriated while the institutions that generate wealth remain elsewhere.

This is not simply an unequal market. It is an extractive one. Like earlier colonial economies that accumulated wealth through the appropriation of Afrikan land, labour and resources, the contemporary football economy increasingly accumulates value through the appropriation of socially produced human capability. The frontier of extraction has shifted. What is being anticipated, evaluated and commercialised is no longer only Afrikan labour, but Afrikan futures. Childhood itself becomes incorporated into circuits of global accumulation long before young people enter the labour market.

Football is often celebrated as a universal language of merit, mobility and opportunity. This article suggests a different reading. It is also a story about whose labour remains invisible, whose care remains uncompensated and whose hopes become available for commercial appropriation. The spectacle of the global game rests upon forms of social reproduction that rarely appear in balance sheets, transfer fees or television rights, despite constituting the indispensable foundation upon which football’s commercial success is built.

To recognise this is not to deny the transformative opportunities that football has created for many Afrikan players and their families. It is to insist that these individual successes cannot obscure the structural political economy that makes them possible. Before football becomes entertainment, it is extraction. Before it becomes commerce, it is care. Before there is a transfer market, there are households, mothers, communities and boys whose lives have already been reorganised around the demands of a global industry.

The scout arrives on Saturday.

The transfer market arrives years later.

But long before either,

Afrikan communities have already done the work.

(This article forms part of a series of four articles  on African football and global political economy. A companion article, Afrikan Football Economy Subsidising the World (Pheko, forthcoming)is being concurrently published.)

(By Lebohang Liepollo Pheko)

(Image Credit: Clint Strydom, “Transkei (4)” / Clint Strydom Photography)

How do we, as a society, in a free, democratic dispensation, address the enduring legacy of spatial apartheid

On July 2, 2026, the Constitutional Court of South Africa issued a “landmark decision”, a decision that should be read by every housing, anti-eviction, labor activist as well as every city planner and elected official in Cape Town, across South Africa, around the world, dominated as the world is by the brutality and complexity, by the logic and practice of expulsions, of global cities on a planet of slums. The decision begins, “At its core, this case raises a fundamental constitutional question: how do we, as a society, in a free, democratic dispensation, address the enduring legacy of spatial apartheid? The submissions in these matters have highlighted the crucial distinction between merely distributing resources and ensuring that those resources are distributed in a manner that actively dismantles historical inequalities shaped by race and class along geographical lines. A city’s architecture tells the story of its soul.”

A city’s architecture tells the story of its soul.

Where do you live? What is your city’s architecture? How has that soul baring, soul bearing architecture changed in the last ten, twenty, thirty years? In the past half century or so, when the world economy spawned both a planet of slums and a planet of global cities marked by mcmansionsa and, even more, formally and informally gated communities? A city’s architecture tells the story of its soul.

The judgment continues: “In Cape Town, as in most, if not all, South African cities, that story remains one of division – where the echoes of apartheid’s spatial planning continue to reverberate through its streets and suburbs. Every morning, thousands of Cape Town’s workers board buses, taxis and trains in the pre-dawn darkness, travelling for hours from the city’s periphery to its centre. Their daily journey is not just a commute – it is a living testament to the enduring legacy of spatial injustice that this case glaringly exposes before this Court. The main question in this matter is whether the State, as custodian of public land, has a legal obligation to address spatial divisions within Cape Town, or whether, through its actions, it is perpetuating divisions without breaching any legal duty.”

While many tumble from bed into their home-based workspaces and others commute perhaps a half hour to an hour or so to work, around the world it is considered normal that those who work the most hours and are paid the least spend the most time, inordinate amounts of time, getting to work and returning home. The impact of those treks is, at best, deeply corrosive, for both individual and community. And, of course, the impacts of these dire conditions are worsened by gender. This is urban design, and the feeling in too many places has been, “Yes, it’s `unfortunate’, but really, what can we do?” The Constitutional Court answered, as did activists and organizers, from movements such as Ndifuna Ukwazi and Reclaim the City who have been organizing and mobilizing on this particular case since 2016. A wild patience took them to this decision.

The decision goes on to explain the concept of social housing: “Pervasive spatial inequality could only be combatted by housing schemes seeking to ensure that access to areas of opportunity is more evenly distributed across the population so as to cure the deep geographical divides. This includes subsidising people’s occupation in areas they were previously excluded from, thereby fostering integration and improving the prospects of occupants. Government could bring this about by acquiring, developing, converting or upgrading buildings for integrated housing schemes. By placing segments of the population closer to economic opportunities and social services, social housing is exactly such a scheme. It strives to ensure that well-located, affordable and quality rental homes are made available to segments of the public in locations that enable them to benefit from greater proximity to economic opportunities and to health and educational facilities and social amenities. The importance of social housing, therefore, cannot be understated.”

The importance of social housing cannot be understated.

From there, the decision enters into the details of the case, which I won’t go into here. The decision is here; summary responses are here and here. They’re all fascinating. The key is that the Constitution assures the right to adequate and dignified housing, and that means, among other things, housing that supports a dignified life, dignified in and of itself, dignified in the context of the general society. It’s not enough to build a house “somewhere”. The location matters … as a matter of law.

Further, pipeline plans and projects that [a] did not emerge from any consultation with the disenfranchised communities, [b] continue to stick social housing in the far peripheries of the city, and [c] generally don’t materialize anyway are “not in compliance”. Translate: mean less than the paper they’re written on. The City of Cape Town was told to get serious about providing real, affordable, dignified housing in “amenity-rich” neighborhoods, to provide detailed plans which will be monitored by the court, and to rethink its approach to housing and, perhaps even more, to those in need of decent housing.

The final point is that the right to decent, dignified and adequate housing is and must be a codified, Constitutional right. If it’s not … make it so.

A city’s architecture tells the story of its soul. What’s in yours?

(by Dan Moshenberg)

(Photo Credit: Matthew Hirsch / GroundUp)

Why don’t you go back …

Stories change and yet remain the same, sometimes over time, sometimes in translation, sometimes just because, just because they’re haunting. Here’s an example, perhaps. In the 1950s, Baltimore, where my family lived, was deeply, though by that point largely “informally”, segregated. It was called “neighborhood charm”: White neighborhoods, Black neighborhoods. White neighborhoods were either Jewish or Christian. Then White Christian neighborhoods divided into White ethnic zones. I was six at the time of this story.

I lived in a working- to lower middle class Jewish neighborhood. I was playing with the girl next door, as we often did. We got into an argument … as we often did. At one point, I said something, I don’t remember what, that infuriated her, infuriated her so much that she trembled, looked at me, speechless, and then said, “Why don’t you back to where you came from?”

We had come from Europe, Holocaust survivors. My mother was Belgian, my father was Polish, I was born in Belgium. My parents “spoke with an accent” (welcome to America). I knew my neighbor had no idea where I came from and doubted she knew that Belgium existed. So, with that knowledge, I replied, “Where do you think I came from?”

Silence.

Silence.

Then her face lit up and she said, gleefully and loudly, “Africa!”

That’s the story.

Where did she learn “Africa!”? When did she learn “Africa!”? How did she learn “Africa!”? Those are the questions I’ve had for decades. But today, as I watch xenophobic movements, including on the African continent, rally and march, I wonder as well at the joy she felt, the deep, satisfying pleasure she felt, when she could say, “Africa!”

Some stories stay with you.

(by Dan Moshenberg)

(Image Credit: Ad Reinhardt, “Abstratct Painting” / MoMA)

States of abandonment: In evictions, who abandons whom?

“Zones of abandonment … accelerate the death of the unwanted. In this bureaucratically and relationally sanctioned register of social death, the human, the mental and the chemical are complicit: their entanglement expresses a common sense that authorized the lives of some while disallowing the lives of others.”
João Biehl, Vita: Life in a Zone of Social Abandonment

This story is about a day in the life of Sherry Gudger, a resident of Halethorpe, in Baltimore County, in Maryland. Sherry Gudger is a single mother living with multiple sclerosis. On or around August 7 of this year, Sherry Gudger received a notice stating that she would be evicted on the 25th of August. According to Ms. Gudger, she “did her best to remove her personal possessions from her third-floor apartment”. She didn’t manage to remove everything. August 25th was the first day of school for her 8-year-old son. Ms. Gudger walked her son to school, returned to the apartment, and found that all her belongings had been thrown away. These belongings included “her passport card, clothing, work tools, her eight-year-old son’s bed, and other furniture.” The trashing of her estate was completely legal. Baltimore County has a “Placement of Personal Property” ordinance, which says that a tenant’s belongings removed during an eviction “shall be considered abandoned”. Sherry Gudger has joined a lawsuit challenging both the loss of her possessions and the law itself. The action was “lawful”, but was it right? Further, and really, did Sherry Gudger “abandon” her personal property … or was she abandoned by the processes of eviction?

These questions have already been asked and answered. In 2024, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit struck down a similar law in Baltimore City. According to Maryland Legal Aid, representing Sherry Gudger, “In that case, the court held that tenants are entitled to clear notice that they could permanently lose ownership of their possessions during an eviction and that due process requires a meaningful opportunity to determine whether property was truly abandoned.”

Sherry Gudger explained, “I became part of this lawsuit because I believe everyone should be treated fairly. A lot of people are going through hard times right now, and what happened to me and my family could happen to someone else. People deserve to know what can happen to their property and have a chance to recover the belongings that are important to them.”

People deserve to know, and people deserve a chance to recover. For residents, and often for neighbors and friends, evictions are an existential crisis. That crisis does not endow the State or any entity with the power to reduce them to nothing. That’s what was supposed to happen in Halethorpe. Management told maintenance to go in, grab everything and dump it. Sherry Gudger was supposed to simply disappear … but she refused and refuses to do so. She refuses to be a citizen of the state of abandonment, a zone of social death through forced and unremarkable disappearances. It’s just business as usual. People deserve to know. People deserve a chance to recover. I believe everyone should be treated fairly.

(By Dan Moshenberg)

(Photo Credit: Julie Shields / “The things people told me“)